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a bstr act  Despite the divide between American formalism and theoreti-
cians of minimalism, Barnett Newman’s art received great acclaim from both 
schools of thought. Attempting to unearth the philosophical preconditions 
of this strange constellation, this article argues that the closeness between 
minimalism and formalism is due to their mutual reliance upon phenom-
enology and ordinary language philosophy. However, their proximity also 
conveys their distance, since they imply different interpretations and appli-
cations of the philosophical schools in question. Such theoretical diffe rences 
shed light on Newman’s paintings: both minimalism and formalism are right 
in their accounts – yet not exclusively so. What arguably makes up the dis-
tinctive fascination of Newman’s paintings is their incessant oscillation be-
tween empty physicality and powerful meaning.
k ey wor ds  Barnett Newman, formalism, minimalism, phenomenology, 
ordinary language philosophy
Barnett Newman’s mature paintings, typically consisting of one or more 
so-called “zips” on a monochromatic background, are extremely simple, 
yet powerful. The scarce use of artistic means along with the self-con-
tained appearance raise the question as to whether the paintings convey 
any meaning at all: do Newman’s paintings call upon interpretation and 
convey some kind of meaning, or have they transgressed the line where 
the concept of meaning itself is no longer apt – as if the picture morphs 
into a mere object?
Such questions are not new. According to Richard Shiff, critics started 
dividing into different camps on these central questions already in the 
1960s.1 On the one hand, there were those who emphasised the act of 
creation and the existential subject matter of painting, most famously 
advocated by Harold Rosenberg. Such an understanding was also re-
flected in many of Newman’s own writings, not least in his treatment of 
the sublime.2 On the other hand, the emerging minimalist movement of 
among others Donald Judd, Robert Morris, and Richard Serra conveyed 
a new aesthetic sensibility. Their focus on minimal means (shape, colour, 
composition) and their avoidance of representation and symbolic mean-
ing retroactively influenced the reception of Newman’s art. These critics 
cherished Newman’s willingness to let paint be paint, to let matter and 
form signify nothing beyond their physical presence. In between those 
two camps we might locate a third one, comprising the formalism of 
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Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried. As a critical theory of art, for-
malism paid special attention to the organisation of the structural ele-
ments of art and their particular impact on the aesthetic experience. Its 
proponents were also among those who defended modernist art against 
the extended field of art as expressed in minimalism, pop art, and per-
formance. Although Greenberg and Fried agreed with minimalism in 
emphasising the formal aspects of Newman’s art, they sided with more 
traditional aesthetic approaches in so far as they regarded visual mean-
ing as indispensable. As minor as the difference between minimalism 
and formalism might seem, it turned on the focal question of the future 
of modernism.
This essay aims at unearthing the philosophical presuppositions that 
condition the complex relation between formalism and minimalism. 
In order to make this relation salient, I will start by discussing, rather 
briefly, how formalism and minimalism, despite the fierce antagonism 
of their respective aesthetic orientations, come surprisingly close in their 
responses to Newman’s art (1). I will contend that what establishes their 
closeness, from a philosophical perspective, is their common indebted-
ness to phenomenology and ordinary language philosophy; their dis-
tance is arguably an outcome of the different interpretations of the two 
philosophical movements. These interpretations imply different phe-
nomenological accounts of spatial and temporal experience, as well as of 
the constitution of meaning according to different versions of ordinary 
language philosophy (2–3). Finally, the disclosure of the philosophical 
preconditions of formalism and minimalism paves the way for what I 
take to be a more adequate aesthetic conception of Newman’s paintings 
that moves beyond their oppositions. I propose that the opposition be-
tween sheer physicality and expressive meaning should not be regarded 
as mutually exclusive, but rather as constituting the inherent ambiguity 
of the paintings (4).
1. Newman as received by minimalism and formalism
The centrality of Newman’s art is indisputable to both formalists and 
minimalists. Greenberg repeatedly refers to colour field painters, such as 
Newman, Rothko, and Still, as the peak of high modernism. Underwrit-
ing this perception, Fried argues that “Newman stands alongside Pollock 
as one of the two most seminal figures of Abstract Expressionism”.3 But 
also Donald Judd, representing the minimalist camp, celebrates New-
man’s achievements, stating that “it’s not so rash to say that Newman 
is the best painter in this country”.4 Not only does this converging high 
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regard for Newman’s art make Newman an interesting transitional fig-
ure, situated both inside and outside the confines of modernism; it also 
indicates a strange closeness in the otherwise distinct orientations of for-
malism and minimalism. 
However, the oddity of this closeness can only be appreciated against 
the background of their more general opposing tendencies. According 
to Judd, Newman’s paintings are simply stripes placed on a canvas, in a 
certain pattern, with a certain size and with the use of certain colours. 
“This description,” Judd admits, “may have been dry reading but that’s 
what’s there.”5 Naturally, Judd reads back his own artistic programme 
into Newman’s paintings – or, more precisely, finds his “specific objects” 
foreshadowed there. It is the overcoming of representation and expres-
sive gestures that is at the heart of minimalism’s concern, and in this 
sense Judd regards Newman as transgressing modernism from within. 
The reasons for formalists’ appreciation of Newman are opposite: they 
regard Newman as representative of modernist art, representative be-
cause he solves the problems that are inherent in modernism.
For Greenberg, modernism is a kind of transcendental critique in 
Kant’s sense; it is both a way of making explicit the conditions of possibil-
ity that different disciplines of art presuppose, as well as a self-limitation 
of each discipline to its area of competence.6 This leads to the purification 
of what belongs exclusively to each media of art – to music, to sculpture, 
to painting – that is, to the essence of each medium-specific discipline of 
art. As for painting, Greenberg famously writes that its essence consists 
of flatness and the delimination of flatness, which implies that “the ob-
servance of merely these two norms is enough to create an object which 
can be experienced as a picture”. This view forces him to admit that “a 
stretched or tacked-up canvas already exists as a picture – though not 
necessarily as a successful one”.7 As an unintended consequence, such 
statements leave the door open for minimalism and for minimalism’s 
reading of Newman, for Greenberg seems forced to conclude that, even if 
not good art, a mere object is the natural end-point of modernism’s inher-
ent teleological trajectory.8
But it is possible to inherit formalism in another way, and this other 
way is proposed by Fried and his philosophical ally, Stanley Cavell. In 
keeping with their understanding, there is essence in art, but this essence 
is neither timeless nor teleologically fixed, as Greenberg thinks; rather, 
it is like a convention, i.e. something which gradually changes according 
to cultural developments as well as being subject to constant tests and 
challenges by modern art.9 There is still one vital point on which Fried 
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adheres to Greenberg’s position: he still thinks modernist art is irreduc-
ibly genre-specific. Although Judd regards minimalist works as a specific 
group of objects, they are nonetheless, as he puts it, “neither painting nor 
sculpture”.10 Of course, such a position flies directly in the face of formal-
ists’ fundamental prescription for modernist art as committed to specific 
media. From this Fried draws the conclusion that “[w]hat lies between the 
arts is theater”11, and Fried’s “theater” is the emblem of everything that 
pretends to be or look like modern art, but which fails to live up to its 
demands. Fried’s charge is, of course, that minimalism is theatrical. But 
is it possible to save Newman from theatre? Greenberg and Fried would 
undoubtedly believe so, but Judd – if he accepted the term – would have 
denied it. The interesting thing is that despite these clearly antagonistic 
positions between formalism’s and minimalism’s general approaches to 
art, they still come very close in their reception of Newman’s paintings, 
or more precisely, in their agreement that scale and openness are essen-
tial to Newman’s achievement. 
Starting with the first aspect, everyone recognises that Judd is right in 
stressing the importance of scale; for it is a historical fact that during the 
late 1940s, the canvases of many American artists grew in size. For Judd, 
the importance of scale resides in the unmediated effect with which it 
confronts the spectator. Newman, along with Pollock and Rothko, did 
contribute to the discovery of scale and its function in painting, a discov-
ery Judd regards as one of the most important in the twentieth century.12 
Judd’s assessment is, of course, motivated by his commitment to the 
programme of the evolving minimalist art. For one thing, one of Judd’s 
own reasons for leaving the conventional painting behind and generat-
ing three-dimensional objects is to exceed it in “power”. For another, the 
primacy of scale over form and content also points to the primacy of the 
physical basis of the painting over its pictorial meaning. As Judd puts it: 
“The painting is nearly an entity, one thing, and not the indefinable sum 
of a group of entities and references.”13 For this reason, the simplicity and 
unity of Newman’s paintings draw them close to Judd’s specific objects. 
Formalism also regards scale as internal to the achievement of abstract 
expressionism; Greenberg, for instance, notes how scale and size assure 
purity of colours and the intensity of an unlimited room – an intensity 
not unlike Judd’s “power”, one might assume.14 
Newman’s paintings are also emphatically open, and what Judd im-
plies by openness is a form freed from traditional conventions. Newman 
is free from the limits of naturalism and from any kind of representa-
tionalism, but Judd also claims that Newman transcends limitations that 
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have governed much of abstract painting since Mondrian, namely its 
dependency upon geometry. Although Newman displays what could be 
taken as a simple geometrical form – his “zips”– Judd believes that he 
does not yield to any of the ontological presuppositions for doing so (e.g. 
what Judd thinks of as Mondrian’s Platonism).15 In much the same vein, 
Greenberg agrees that Still, Rothko, and Newman are the first to produce 
serious abstract pictures, freed from the ties of the past, more specif-
ically, from geometrical abstraction. According to Greenberg, it would be 
utterly mistaken to read Newman’s paintings as responses to geometri-
cal occupations; the employment of simple geometrical figures is rather 
a freely chosen way to solve the internal problems of the medium of 
painting.16 For Judd, the final and decisive limitation of Newman is that 
he remains a painter, confining himself to a rectangle hanging on the 
wall. Since Judd opts for three-dimensional objects, it becomes clear that 
he disagrees with the more technical meaning of “openness” as defined 
by Greenberg and Fried. Their sense of openness refers to the abstract 
colour field which conveys painterly meaning, not by invoking tactile il-
lusions (as architecture and sculpture do), but solely by optical or visual 
means. Contrary to Judd’s conviction, it is precisely Newman’s fidelity to 
the medium of painting that gives rise to formalism’s high regard for it.17
These overall tendencies draw the minimalist and formalist approach-
es to Newman closer to each other than one might expect from their 
dissimilar standpoints. If they agree on Newman to such a degree, why 
are their perspectives on the significance and purpose of art so deeply 
divided? Of course, they do advocate different normative opinions of art 
– but are there other, more philosophical reasons hidden beneath this 
simultaneous convergence and divergence?
2. Two interpretations of phenomenology
 One way of answering this question is by interrogating the philosophi-
cal presuppositions of minimalism and formalism. Such influential 
commentators as Rosalind E. Krauss and Hal Foster point out how mini-
malism conveys a new philosophical reflection on art, both with regard 
to structures of meaning and perception. This philosophical change is 
often depicted as a change from idealism – supposedly presupposed in 
formalism and expressed in abstract expressionism – towards ordinary 
language philosophy and phenomenology. In both cases, the attention 
is led away from the ideal and towards the concrete. My claim is that 
there is some truth in this, but that the change has on the whole been 
misconceived. It is true that there is a change in theoretical orientation, 
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but the change is not a matter of rejecting or embracing phenomenology 
and ordinary language philosophy. It is, I will argue, a matter of different 
interpretations of the two strands of philosophy, having to do with dif-
ferent views on each philosophy’s relation to the world (time and space), 
subjectivity and meaning. 
Starting with phenomenology, minimalist works force a shift of em-
phasis, from the more or less hidden intention of the work to the inten-
tionality of the beholder, that is, to the way the beholder perceptually 
directs him- or herself toward the work.18 Minimalism’s stripping bare 
of the aesthetic object invokes an intensified self-reflective awareness 
in the beholder; with almost nothing engaging the view, the beholder’s 
awareness is thrown back on him- or herself. Such a shift follows the 
structure of Edmund Husserl’s main methodological step, namely the 
phenomenological reduction: by distancing oneself from one’s lived ex-
perience – the so-called natural attitude in which one is usually absorbed 
– one guides the intentional ray away from the intentional object in or-
der to reflect back on how the phenomena manifest themselves in the 
first place.19 In Husserl’s view, phenomenological reduction uncovers the 
constitutive interplay of world, given in time and space, and subjectivity. 
The phenomenological reduction does not remove, but adds, as it were, 
a third dimension to the two-dimensionality of our natural attitude.20 
Art, too, has the power to initiate the reduction; whether confronted by 
abstraction or literal objects, our habitual preconceptions are radically 
questioned and thus brought to our attention. Two central conditions for 
our world relation are indeed how the world is given to us in space and in 
time. However, minimalism and formalism draw on significantly differ-
ent accounts of our spatio-temporal perception of the world.
The minimalist works call attention to space by bringing the entire 
situation into account: the staging, context, position, and horizon are re-
garded as part of the work.21 Since the beholders’ bodily awareness of 
the entire situation is integral to the aesthetic experience, they are no 
longer regarded as spectators of self-contained works, looking at them 
from a distance. Moving between, say, the enormous meta-constructions 
of Richard Serra surely invokes bodily impressions and reactions. How 
the living body participates in such perceptual processes is elaborated 
by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his Phenomenology of Perception, a work 
that has become almost a standard reference in accounts of minimalism. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, the spatial dimension is inherently linked 
to the possible movements and habits of the human body.22 Confronted 
by, or even surrounded by, Serra’s objects, we become immediately aware 
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of our embodiment as essential to our orientation in space, in a way that 
resembles the phenomenological reduction to our basic, subjective condi-
tions for perceiving the world. 
Time is also an integral factor in the minimalist situation. There is 
nothing ecstatic about the temporal experience that is enacted in mini-
malism; it concerns duration as it flows in everyday life. Moving around 
one of Robert Morris’ L-beams, nothing new happens; the anticipations 
of the hidden parts are harmoniously fulfilled as one inspects the beams 
from different angles. As in ordinary experience, for the most part tem-
porality contains no surprises, but merely unfolds more of the same. In-
deed, as minimalism undertakes a reduction, it manifests an essential 
homogenous space and time. There are no traces of particularly impor-
tant places and no fullness of time that stand out; Judd’s industrially pro-
duced “stacks” suggest that they can progressively go on and on in space 
and time without anything qualitatively new occurring. 
Phenomenology challenges the old dichotomies in idealist philosophy 
between inner and outer and between subject and object, and so does 
minimalism. As alluded to above, Foster characterises the theoretical 
preconditions of abstract expressionism as idealist, and argues that mini-
malism’s new phenomenological orientation effectively undercuts this 
precondition: “Minimalism thus contradicts the two dominant models 
of the abstract expressionist, the artist as existential creator (advanced 
by Harold Rosenberg) and the artist as formal critic (advanced by Green-
berg)”.23 There are indeed differences in the implied philosophy of mini-
malism and abstract expressionism, and Rosenberg’s emphasis on the 
act of creation and its psychological and existential source does not fit 
neatly into the phenomenological attention that Judd’s objects invoke.24 
However, it is not fully convincing when Foster claims that the emer-
gence of minimalism entails a radical change from ontology of essence 
to epistemology of experience in art. As I interpret it, formalism’s philo-
sophical preconditions are not far removed from those of minimalism, 
and particularly not from minimalism’s theoretical reliance on phenom-
enological accounts of human experience.25 
Fried was actually among the first to apply Merleau-Ponty’s phenom-
enology to art criticism. Fried refers to Merleau-Ponty already in his first 
review of Anthony Caro’s sculptures from 1963, and Merleau-Ponty is 
frequently referred to in later essays.26 Although Greenberg might not 
directly refer to phenomenological philosophers, this does not invalidate 
the fact that also his criticism might very well be thought of in phenom-
enological terms. The appeal to the beholder’s experience of the work is 
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the final court of appeal for formalist art criticism as it is for phenom-
enology. Speaking for the whole tradition of formal criticism, from Roger 
Fry via Greenberg to himself, Fried writes: “All judgment of value starts 
and ends in experience.”27
What Caro’s painted steel constructions provoke, according to Fried, 
is essentially our bodily mode of being in the world. Caro has found 
a way to extend modernist sensibility in sculpture to include our kin-
aesthetic involvements with things.28 This might at first seem puzzling 
since Fried so strongly attacks minimalism for its manner of making the 
bodily presence felt. However, as he retrospectively explains, it is not the 
experience of bodily orientation as such that Fried opposes, “but rather 
that literalism [i.e. minimalism] theatricalized the body, put it endlessly 
on stage, made it uncanny or opaque to itself, hollowed it out, deadened 
its expressiveness, denied its finitude and in a sense its humanness”.29
Caro’s sculptures also challenge the way sculptures are convention-
ally situated in space. Caro’s sculptures impress themselves as bodily 
experiences – just like minimalist objects are reported to do. Defenders 
of both formalism and minimalism invoke Merleau-Ponty on this point, 
but there are significant differences. For Fried, the project Caro shares 
with architecture is the preoccupation with the fact that we have human 
bodies and are surrounded by a world. However, Caro’s way of explor-
ing that fact is by posing something like a phenomenological reduction: 
it draws attention to that fact, not by invoking alienating “theatre”, as 
minimalism is charged of doing, but by means of abstraction. Accord-
ing to Fried, Caro’s ambitions to make sculpture out of our “primordial 
involvement with modes of being in the world” can only be realised “if 
antiliteral – that is, radically abstract – terms for that involvement can 
be found”.30 While minimalists are satisfied with the effect the objects 
cause on the beholder, Fried thinks that Caro’s sculptures must be seen 
as integral and meaningful in another way – as gestures.31 The fact that 
painting, as opposed to sculpture, seeks to free itself from the tactile il-
lusions does not mean that it is cut loose from our incarnated being in 
the world. Formalism’s appeal to opticality, I take it, is another way of 
exploring one’s sense of space by way of abstraction – that is, in abstrac-
tion or derivation from (yet without denying its ontological dependence 
on) other tactile and kinaesthetic involvements with our surroundings. 
Newman brings this opticality to fruition.32
Gestural meaning is the central theme of Merleau-Ponty’s investiga-
tion of the source of meaning common to spoken language and painting. 
In “Indirect Language and the Voice of Silence”, which Fried explicitly 
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draws on, Merleau-Ponty argues that painting and sculpture must be re-
garded as expressive gestures that respond to the world as perceived. 
Painting articulates aspects of tacit and bodily perceptions that other-
wise will remain unnoticed. According to Merleau-Ponty, every bodily 
gesture – and in particular, every artistic gesture – cannot help but 
display meaning. The meaning stems from the organic unity of world 
and the body, a unity which, in Merleau-Ponty’s phrase, condemns us to 
meaning.33 Such expressive meaning is indeed something the minimal-
ists want to avoid – an avoidance that formalists think is tantamount 
to giving up the burdens of art. Merleau-Ponty claims that not even the 
geometrical abstraction can escape such meaning: “Now austerity and 
the obsession with geometrical surfaces and forms … still have an odor 
of life, even if it is a shameful or despairing life. Thus the painting always 
says something”.34 A spatial location will hence inescapably do more 
than just reflect a homogeneous space, it will always suggest a human 
space with its complex topography of value and meaning. 
Perhaps the most obvious juncture that highlights the different phe-
nomenological approaches of minimalism and formalism concerns tem-
porality. Fried strongly contrasts the time of minimalist objects with 
the temporality of modernist works of art. Judd’s repetition of identical 
units suggests some kind of indifferent duration that Fried terms “pre-
sentment”.35 A successful modernist work, on the other hand, claims a 
kind of “presentness” or “instantaneousness”, in which the work reveals 
itself anew in every moment for the attentive spectator. “We are literal-
ists most of the time”, Fried writes, perhaps alluding to how the homog-
enous time, “presentment”, has come to take hold of our everyday percep-
tion; and against this he claims that “[p]resentness is grace”.36 Although 
Fried later regrets the strong religious connotation of his rhetoric, and al-
though it is an exaggeration to turn his plea for modernism to a dogmatic 
act of faith or even substitute for religious faith,37 it is not totally beside 
the point to contrast profane, ordinary time with something quite differ-
ent – something like a sublime moment. Here, Fried is in line with one of 
the most important phenomenologists, Martin Heidegger, as Heidegger 
calls attention to the phenomenological impact of ruptures in time – the 
moments when the levelled everyday is brought to a standstill and we are 
faced with existence as such.38 For Fried, however, such ruptures are not 
matters of anguish and death, but of the experience of art in the moment 
it lays claims on the beholder. Clearly, this understanding of art’s tem-
porality stands in stark contrast to minimalism’s hypostatisation of the 
endless return of the same. For formalists, the disclosed time and space 
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as manifested in e.g. Newman’s art are heterogeneous dimensions, with 
ruptures and hidden depths. 
3. Two interpretations of Wittgenstein
In Krauss’ reading, modern sculpture can only be fully appreciated if 
we realise how it develops alongside not only phenomenology, but also 
linguistic philosophy.39 In this section I will therefore proceed from the 
different phenomenological interpretations and discuss different ways of 
drawing on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ordinary language philosophy. 
Not unlike Foster’s overall strategy, Krauss argues that the passage 
from abstract expressionism to minimalism brought a new and more 
adequate philosophical paradigm to art. Although minimalism avoids 
traces of human gestures and organic life, Krauss argues that it does 
not aim at overcoming meaning as such. What minimalism comes to is 
rather the invocation of a new sense of meaning. The model of meaning 
that abstract expressionism presupposes is, according to Krauss, that of 
individuals with private inner lives who seek authentic communication 
through an outer medium. This theory can be seen at work from their 
paintings, such as Willem de Kooning’s “Door to the River”, where the 
relation between the illusionist space and the privacy of the individual 
self is arguably at stake.40 Just one glance at Judd’s serially produced ob-
jects is enough to realise that there is no allusion to an interior of which 
this object is an outer sign. If there is meaning in such works, it is com-
pletely exhausted in the exteriority itself. Krauss takes minimalism’s ap-
peal to such exteriority to be the artistic conclusion of the later Wittgen-
stein’s so-called private language argument. Wittgenstein is interpreted 
as denying that meaning could be produced in our private interiorities. 
Such private constitutions of meaning would only mean that we became 
locked up in separate universes. The sense of “green”, says Krauss, would 
then name only what you alone sense and would thus have no value in 
public communication.
This question of language and meaning helps us by analogy to see the positive 
side of minimalism’s endeavor, for in refusing to give the work of art an illu-
sionistic center or interior, minimal artists are simply re-evaluating the logic 
of a particular source of meaning rather than denying meaning to the aesthetic 
object altogether. They are asking that meaning be seen as arising from – to 
continue the analogy with language – a public, rather than a private space.41 
There is no question that Wittgenstein is challenging a certain picture 
of meaning, and it is also clear that he wants to shift the emphasis from 
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private to public criteria. What is discussed in the vast commentary lit-
erature on the private language argument is, however, what becomes of 
the inner as traditionally conceived. Krauss goes far in interpreting Witt-
genstein as eliminating privacy altogether, for in her reading of Serra’s 
art she concludes that we ourselves are nothing but the sum of our visible 
gestures, which she thinks corresponds with what novelists in France 
thought at that time: “I do not write. I am written.”42 In other words, 
minimalism corresponds with the “death of the author”, which is to say, 
the end of the search for original intentions in works. The public web of 
symbolic structures is all there is to meaning. 
Krauss’ reading of Wittgenstein makes him look more or less like a 
behaviourist equipped with access to linguistic structures: there is noth-
ing except outer behaviour, which lends itself to be read as structures 
of signs. In this account, the interiority is simply eliminated, reduced 
to behaviour. However, it is far from clear that this is the only or most 
coherent reading of Wittgenstein. Just to indicate how problematic such 
a reading is, let me refer to one of Wittgenstein’s dialogues: “‘Are you not 
really a behaviorist in disguise? Aren’t you at bottom really saying that 
everything except human behavior is a fiction?’ — If I do speak of a fic-
tion, then it is of a grammatical fiction.”43 
Fried seeks to combine phenomenology’s insights into experience 
with that of Wittgenstein’s understanding of language and conventions. 
Fried’s interest in Wittgenstein is in a way opposite to that of Krauss. The 
reason Fried turns to Wittgenstein’s philosophy is that he there finds a 
philosophy that also strives to defeat theatricality.44 Fried must obviously 
rely on another reading of Wittgenstein than Krauss does. Fried’s under-
standing of Wittgenstein relies heavily on the early works of Cavell.45 
There are several cross-references between Fried and Cavell from the late 
1960s and early 1970s, and in particular they circle around the notion 
of “acknowledgement”. In Fried’s writing, acknowledgement seems to 
mean more or less “acceptance”, with reference to art’s frank acceptance 
of its own physical means and limitations as the conditions of expressive 
meaning. But the conditions and limitations that are of primary interest 
to Cavell are not art but the I-you relationship. In this relationship both 
unity and separation are involved. The notion of acknowledgment first 
shows up in discussions of the epistemological problem of other minds, a 
problem to which Wittgenstein’s private language argument can be read 
as a response.46
Cavell agrees with Krauss’ stress on the public dimension of meaning 
in his reading of the private language argument. But, Cavell insists, Witt-
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genstein nowhere denies the possibility of a private language, only cer-
tain misguided pictures of it. More accurately, the picture Wittgenstein 
wants to free us from is the private as a secret interiority, unavailable to 
others but transparent to the self, a picture in which inner meaning must 
be translated to outer meaning by means of a third, extrinsic feature: the 
body or language.47 To render human expressivity meaningful, Cavell 
agues, it has to accord with a common orientation in natural reactions 
and shared linguistic grammar. What gives rise to scepticism towards 
others’ meaning, and more generally to other minds, is that such com-
mon meaning can fail: from time to time we experience that we remain 
strangers to each other, that we disguise our feelings or refrain from 
communicating. However, Cavell argues that such cases are not matters 
of inexpressivity, but of deflected modes of expressivity. Human expres-
sivity is indeed complex, but it is also limited, for it is bound to the fragile 
conditions that our shared grammar provides. Our relation to the other 
does not rely on proofs, but on acknowledging other’s gestures (bodily or 
linguistic) as expressive of mind.48 As an analogue to the human body, 
Fried thinks that modernist art must acknowledge its physical support 
as its conditions for its expressivity, as Newman exemplarily does.49 
As Cavell takes it, the private language argument leads neither to a 
behaviouristic elimination of an inner realm, nor to a symbolic struc-
turalism in which human meaning is merely a derivate of the system. 
Human expressions, according to Cavell, imply a subject willing to take 
responsibility for what one says without fully controlling its meaning. 
The private language is a depiction of a sceptical, secret wish, namely 
the wish to secure meaning within an inexpressible interiority, without 
having to expose ourselves and being responsible for our expressions: 
A fantasy of necessary inexpressiveness would solve a simultaneous set of 
metaphysical problems: it would relieve me of the responsibility for making 
myself known to others – as though if I were expressive that would mean 
continuously betraying my experiences, incessantly giving myself away; it 
would suggest that my responsibility for self-knowledge takes care of itself 
– as though the fact that others cannot know my (inner) life means that I 
cannot fail to.50
The relief from the burden of expressiveness can either be established by 
securing a secret interiority, but also by its flip-side – by relying on a flaw-
less and impersonal linguistic system. Both the fantasy of a secret inner 
world and Krauss’ behaviourism merged with structuralism are moved 
by a sceptical wish to escape the burden of meaning, in Cavell’s view. 
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From Cavell’s (and Fried’s) perspective, it seems reasonable to suspect 
that minimalism’s prefabricated boxes, plates, or beams share in this 
sceptical fantasy.51 Even if minimalist objects cannot fully escape mean-
ing, their mode of meaning bears no personal traits; they deliberately put 
an end to the question of expression and intention – which is the proper 
question that art raises and demands responses to. This is why, according 
to Cavell and Fried, pop art and minimalism do not even aspire to raise 
the serious question of art. Modernism, as both Cavell and Fried think of 
it, has made art even more fragile than other human utterances, for the 
burden of modernism means to go on expressing oneself in a time where 
there are no established criteria for what counts as artistic expression or 
what its medium demands. Modernism’s modes of expression and com-
munication do not rely on established conventions – they do not have 
anything more to go on than deeply personal styles.52
According to Cavell, the relevant question to a meaningful work con-
cerns its intention – not, of course, as if intentions were stored in the pri-
vate soul of the artist, but as the meaningful dimension of the produced 
work. To be interested in the work’s intentions is to take seriously how 
art celebrates the breadth and even inescapability of human meaning-
fulness. Since chance, brute nature, or sheer objecthood do not display 
intentional meaning, they cannot count as works of art. Someone must 
be responsible for meaning it: “The artist is responsible for everything 
that happens in his work – and not just in the sense that it is done, but 
in the sense that it is meant. It is a terrible responsibility; very few men 
have the gift and the patience and the singleness to shoulder it.”53 From 
this angle, minimalism appears to undo this yoke by appealing to a sense 
of meaning that is cut loose from human expressiveness, its fragility, and 
its subjective responsibilities. 
Arguably, then, formalism relies on another understanding of Witt-
genstein than minimalism does. Where Krauss thinks minimalism cash-
es in Wittgenstein’s turn to the public at the expense of the inner realm, 
Cavell thinks Wittgenstein supports formalism’s stress on meaning as a 
commitment to personal expressivity: “the first fact of art is that they are 
meant, meant to be understood.”54
4. The ambiguous internal movement
The common points of departure (phenomenology and ordinary lan-
guage philosophy) and their different interpretations enable us to more 
clearly understand the complex relation between formalism and mini-
malism. And given such an understanding, it is now possible to shed 
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further light on Newman’s art. Both formalism and minimalism regard 
Newman as exemplary, revealing their programmatic conception of art; 
this can either mean that one or both are entirely wrong, or that New-
man’s paintings situate themselves precisely on the transition between 
high modernism and minimalism. The fact that their respective respons-
es to Newman agree on the paintings’ principal dimensions – their acute 
sense of scale and openness – speaks in favour of such a transitional posi-
tion. Even if Newman’s transitional character has some obvious histori-
cal backing, it does not solve the more theoretical question of how, in that 
case, such a position should be conceived. Shiff’s detailed discussion of 
this issue does not solve the case, nor does it attempt to do so. For on the 
one hand, there is evidence that Judd captures Newman’s phenomeno-
logical (in the sense of minimalist) attention to the scale and physicality 
of his works. Yet, on the other hand, the expressive, even metaphysical 
dimension is never given up by Newman. Shiff concludes: “If there was 
phenomenology to Newman’s art (‘physical properties’), there was also 
metaphysics (‘the spiritual’). Newman himself regarded his art as a mix 
of phenomenology and metaphysics.”55 While formalism never gives in 
to metaphysical interpretations, its reception at least tries to preserve the 
expressive dimension in which Newman’s spiritual aspirations can be 
redeemed. 
One might perhaps say that both formalists and minimalists have suc-
cessfully pointed at some aspects of Newman’s achievement, but that 
they at the same time have failed. They have failed not only because their 
respective accounts remain inadequate, but also because each preferred 
account excludes the other. While minimalism wants to remove every 
trace of human expressivity in order to move towards a depersonalised 
sense of meaning, formalism defends the necessary human expressivity 
and sees its success in overcoming the medium’s objecthood. Although 
formalists openly acknowledge the presence of physical conditions in 
modernist painting, the verge between art and objecthood remains abso-
lute. Greenberg articulates the options thus: “[L]ike any other kind of pic-
ture, the modernist one still assumes that its identity as a picture shuts 
out awareness of its identity as an object. Otherwise it becomes, at best, 
sculpture; at worst, a mere object.”56 From both sides – both minimalism 
and formalism – the antithetical logic is upheld: either painting or object.
 The third option I want to propose is to displace the conflict: from a 
struggle about the adequate reception of the paintings, to a struggle that 
goes on within the paintings. For is it not precisely the unresolved con-
flict that constitutes the intriguing dimension of Newman’s painting? 
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Is it not its closeness to a simple object along with its powerful expres-
sivity that constitutes its fascination? In objecting to formalism on this 
point, Jay M. Bernstein suggests that minimalism should not so much be 
regarded as something external to modernist painting, but rather like 
a permanent inner tendency. In drawing on Cavell’s understanding of 
scepticism, Bernstein regards modernism as bargaining with objecthood 
in a way similar to Wittgenstein’s bargaining with scepticism: “Every 
modernist work raises the issue of fraudulence and trust, which is to say 
that every modernist work of art raises an equivalent of the problem of 
other minds: what is it for a material display to be a display of human 
meaning, that is, the display of a person?”57 Modernist art’s fate is to 
expose itself to the threat of the nihilism inherent in minimalism, and 
not to excommunicate it, as Fried tends to. There is no guarantee that 
meaning survives this threat. Newman’s paintings can convey meaning, 
but nothing prevents them from sinking into mere objects hanging on 
the wall. 
A similar point can be made with regard to the two interpretations of 
phenomenology we have discussed. For the two interpretations implied 
in minimalism and formalism are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
They can rather be regarded as two rivalling attitudes within an overall 
phenomenological enterprise. At least Husserl opens up for two such at-
titudes in which the spatio-temporal world is sketched out differently, 
one called naturalistic attitude, the other personalistic attitude. In the 
naturalistic attitude – roughly speaking the attitude of the natural scien-
tist – the world is perceived of as matter, as mere things stripped of any 
value or practical use. It is the world of things causally related within ho-
mogenous space and time. It would not be correct to say that the things, 
approached from the naturalistic attitude, are senseless, but they are cer-
tainly not bearers of any human expressivity.58 As I see it, the naturalistic 
attitude comes close to the one that minimalist works demand. However, 
we are able to change our attitude, and for formalism any work of art 
worthy of the name demands another attitude – something like a per-
sonalistic attitude. According to this attitude, the disclosed world is here 
regarded as already meaningful, as the field of practice, communication, 
and value. The world is encountered as the field in which we unfold our 
lives.59 In the personalistic attitude, nothing can be stripped bare of its 
meaning; everything is already “condemned to meaning”, as Merleau-
Ponty (and later Cavell) will have it.60 Although both these attitudes are 
part of the phenomenological repertoire and hence internally related, it 
might be possible to read Newman’s painting as enacting a particular 
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tension or strife between them. The typical effect of his works is to in-
duce the oscillation between them.61
Let me take “Abraham” as an example. At first sight it offers a large-
scaled black canvas. The almost monochrome appearance makes the 
whole picture move towards emptiness. The initial impression is disap-
pointing because the painting does not seem to have anything to convey. 
Its physicality – its rectangular shape, the canvas, the black paint – is 
made visible because it seems to be the only thing that is there: a mere 
object. However, one gradually becomes aware that something is going 
on in the painting after all. From the dark green-black field emerges a 
broad stripe in black. The stripe is not completely symmetrically ar-
ranged, as the orange zip in Newman’s “Onement” is, but is rather placed 
slightly to the left side. This intrigues the perceptual process and makes 
the play between the field and the zip into a fascinating oscillation be-
tween background and “figure”. The questions arise: What has primacy 
and what must fade? What insists on being the figure and what must 
constitute the background?62 There is some meaning to this, as if the 
zips, their contours and interplay of dark colours, make up what Fried 
calls a meaningful syntax or gestures of their own. These gestures reflect 
meaning absorbed from the world outside the painting, transformed by 
abstraction. This expression opens up a world. This is not the ordinary 
world as we already know it, but a world distant enough to open our 
sensibility anew, and intimate enough to refer back to the primordial, 
embodied world relation from which it remains anchored. And yet, the 
means are so scarce that we are never certain that the painting will not 
sink back into a mere object again. This threat is internal to the works 
themselves.
Central to the notion of the sublime is a wavering between the fasci-
nating and the threatening. If the ambiguous movement between ob-
jecthood and expressivity can, in an analogous way, be termed sublime, 
then we have found a way to make sense of the spiritual dimension that 
Newman saw as essential to his art.63 But even more important, this is 
achieved along a path that does not deny the importance of both formal-
ists’ and minimalists’ respective accounts of Newman. What is serious-
ly questioned, however, is each party’s dogmatic, antithetical either-or 
claim on his art as such. For, as I take it, it is precisely by transporting 
the external conflict between formalism and minimalism into Newman’s 
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